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King of Spies: The Dark Reign of America’s Spymaster in
Korea. By Blaine Hardin. New York, Viking, 2017. ISBN: 978-0525-42993-7. Photographs. Notes. Sources cited. Index. Pp. xii,
260. $27.00.
Blaine Harden is a New York Times bestselling author who has written
several books about events on the Korean Peninsula. His 2012 bestseller,
Escape From Camp 14, told the story of a much tortured North Korean man,
Shin Dong-hyuk, who eventually escaped his country’s gulag system and
defected to the South in 2006. It later transpired that Shin’s tale, as it was
related to Harden, was less than fully truthful. Subsequent editions of the
book included an updated Foreword clarifying some of the fictitious aspects of
Shin’s story. Harden faced fewer complications in King of Spies. While some
of the stories it contains are from oral interviews and are not corroborated by
other sources, the bulk of the tale is based on Harden’s painstaking research
into the shadowy world of an Air Force sergeant who somehow managed to
talk his way into the inner sanctum of the South Korean government in the
late 1940s by winning the trust and confidence of the president, Syngman
Rhee. The story of how the relatively untutored sergeant, Donald P. Nichols,
rose to such prominence is truly a fascinating one, and it was one that Nichols
himself tried to tell in a 1981 self-published autobiography. Like Shin, Nichols
sometimes embellished his role and twisted the facts, but the truth in his
story is sufficiently enthralling and it requires no fantasies to make it so.
Harden skillfully sifted fact from fiction, uncovering documentary sources
and interviewing those who knew Nichols, to present the narrative of his
incredibly adventurous life and career.
Harden first stumbled across Nichols’ name while researching a book about a
former North Korean fighter pilot who defected in the spring of 1950, by
flying his Soviet-made Ilyushin IL-10 ground attack fighter to a U. S. airfield
in the South. The first person the pilot was able to speak to in his own
language was the Air Force’s Don Nichols, the high school dropout who ran a
spy ring that was so successful it ingratiated him with President Rhee and
made him one of the most powerful men in the country. How that came to be
is a tale that is superbly told by Harden.
Nichols came from a broken home. His promiscuous mother deserted the
family and left his father brokenhearted, so times were frequently tough
during the Depression. Seeking to escape the poverty and hunger he knew in
his youth, Nichols joined the Army in 1940. He served in India during World
War II, working in a motor pool in Karachi and later volunteering in the
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understaffed morgue where he embalmed his fellow servicemen who had
succumbed to accident or disease. Later Nichols was accepted for training for
the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Tokyo and was assigned to
South Korea upon graduation in 1946. He reported to the tiny CIC
detachment at Kimpo Airfield and found that South Korea was then
embroiled in a violent civil war pitting an anti-communist Right against the
communist Left. Anti-American sentiment ran high as well. A bloody
uprising took place that fall, leading to mass arrests of leftists. The Army
commander in Korea ordered CIC to go on the offensive, engaging in positive
intelligence operations in an effort to develop information about North
Korean and other communist agitators in the South. Nichols embraced that
mission with relish. According to his version of the story, Nichols began his
relationship with Syngman Rhee around that time, recognizing the immense
intelligence benefits to be derived from such close access to government
sources. Nichols also began working closely with the Korean National Police,
witnessing brutal interrogation techniques, torture, and even executions. He
seems to have become inured to it, in all likelihood reasoning that the dire
circumstances justified the means. That attitude would soon pay dividends in
his running of spy operations behind enemy lines in North Korea when war
broke out in June 1950.
Nichols’ relationship with Rhee is one of the most puzzling aspects of the
story, causing one former Air Force historian to wonder why no one at the
time asked: “What the hell is this twenty-three-year-old air force sergeant
doing in the role of private confidant to a head of state?” (35). No one in the
Defense or State Department ever thought to “place Nichols under the
meaningful supervision of a senior intelligence official” (35). By June 1949,
Rhee wrote to U. S. Ambassador John Muccio, personally requesting that
Nichols serve as Rhee’s advisor on Air Affairs for an expanding South Korean
Air Force. The creation of that air force was greatly encouraged by Nichols,
who—in direct opposition to U. S. Military wishes—urged the building of a
separate service divorced from the army, just as the U. S. had done in 1947.
Rhee acceded to Nichols’ advice, and the low-ranked U. S. Air Force sergeant
was given unprecedented influence over how that South Korean Air Force
functioned. Though Nichols was undoubtedly flattered by his close
relationship with Rhee, the president was shrewd in deriving benefits from
the relationship as well. With the withdrawal of U. S. combat troops from
South Korea in the summer of 1949, Rhee felt the vulnerability of his meager
military capability in the face of a much more militant and well equipped
North. While Rhee pressured the American government for additional
military support, he also enlisted Nichols’ aid in using the increasing number
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of alarming intelligence information reports to bolster his efforts. Nichols
dutifully and steadily funneled news of a massive North Korean buildup to his
superiors, eventually getting the attention of the Far East Air Force
commander, General George E. Stratemeyer. The general’s reports of
Nichols’ warnings finally woke up the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who met at
the State Department in March 1950, to begin to figure out just how accurate
Nichols’ detailed reporting was, and whether his dire warnings of impending
war were realistic.
When the Air Force separated from the Army in 1947, the Army’s former CIC
agents generally transferred from assignment to the Army Air Forces to the
new U. S. Air Force. Nichols was one of those CIC agents, but the Air Force
soon created its own investigative arm, the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (AFOSI), which combined criminal and counterintelligence
investigations under one roof. Former Army CIC agents then joined former
Army Criminal Investigations Division agents as co-equals in the new AFOSI.
That agency had no clearly defined wartime mission that by any stretch of the
imagination included even half of the things Nichols was doing in Korea.
Still, backed by his relationship with Rhee and the quality of his intelligence
reports, no one pressed the issue.
Nichols not only was the first American to interview the defecting North
Korean pilot, he also convinced the South Koreans to give the pilot’s IL-10 to
the U. S. and enticed the pilot to work for him as a spy. By then he operated a
tiny AFOSI detachment from his very own, separate spy base. From there he
recruited, trained, and exploited South Korean spies, sending them into the
North—many to a certain death.
His support from the National Police also allowed him access to other
defectors and detainees, from whom he extracted useful intelligence
information. His quest for accurate intelligence prompted him to go to North
Korea himself in 1947, disguised as an Army officer accompanying a special
train transporting supplies to U. S. negotiators in Pyongyang. Later he took
hazardous surveillance flights over the North in unarmed spotter planes to
see for himself the buildup of North Korean military power.
His reporting was undoubtedly highly accurate, so when it drew the attention
of the JCS in March 1950, it also drew the attention of General MacArthur’s
chief of intelligence, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, who—whether out
of stubbornness, arrogance, or pride—refused to credit Nichols’ work as
accurate. Instead, his sycophantic relationship with MacArthur, who believed
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he had insufficient forces in Japan to even consider the possibility of
supporting South Korea, caused him to downplay the prospects of an invasion
of the South. Both Willoughby and MacArthur conspired to turn a blind eye
to events on the Korean Peninsula. Inquiries from the JCS, however, soon
pushed the issue into the limelight. Willoughby not only declined to concede
the accuracy of Nichols’ or other similar reporting from the CIA, he actively
sought to silence the young AFOSI agent. Fortunately, Nichols was able to
deflect the wrath of the vindictive Willoughby because the AFOSI personnel
were assigned to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), not to
MacArthur’s U. S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). KMAG took its
marching orders from the U. S. Ambassador, to whom Willoughby appealed
unsuccessfully in May 1950, in an attempt to get rid of Nichols. The
ambassador was more appreciative of Nichols’ intelligence work, not to
mention his “friendly relationship to key Korean personalities” (55). He
defended Nichols’ work, praised the young agent, and in no uncertain terms
declined to eliminate that source of vital information.
Meanwhile, Nichols made a new friend: Major General Earle E. Partridge, the
Fifth Air Force commander who led all air operations in the Pacific Theater.
They first met at the end of 1949, and Partridge would later be totally stunned
to learn of the threat posed by North Korea, all of which had been reported by
Nichols. Willoughby had never passed on any of Nichols’ information to his
air commander. Partridge quickly recognized the talents and abilities Nichols
exhibited, and he would become one of his most avid supporters, but in June
1950, the Air Force was as unprepared as the other services for the outbreak
of war in Korea.
Nichols’ warnings were validated on Sunday, June 25, 1950, when North
Korean artillery opened fire and a phalanx of Soviet-made T-34 tanks rolled
across the thirty-eighth parallel followed by hordes of North Korean soldiers
crushing all resistance in their path. Nichols quickly notified AFOSI
Headquarters in Tokyo, struggling to make the duty agent understand the
situation over the poor phone connection. As MacArthur scrambled to
respond over the ensuing days, he ordered Partridge to begin air strikes on
the North. The General readily agreed to do so, but he quickly realized his
bombers suffered from a severe handicap. They had no targeting information
about North Korea and though fully ready to drop bombs with wild abandon,
they had no idea what to drop those bombs on. Nichols quickly stepped into
that intelligence gap and began to draw on his vast network of resources to
provide the Air Force with targeting data and maps. While most American
military forces in Korean beat a hasty retreat, Nichols and his AFOSI clerk
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remained behind in Seoul, destroying vital files. In his autobiography,
Nichols began at this point to inflate his heroic deeds, many of which were
later laughingly dismissed by his clerk, Sarbando Torres. Still, Torres had to
admit that Nichols “wasn’t afraid of a damn thing” (72). Despite his tendency
to embellish his deeds, what he actually accomplished over the ensuing
months was quite enough to cement his reputation.
By June 1950, Nichols had been elevated to the rank of warrant officer, and
soon after the war began he was commissioned and quickly promoted to
captain in recognition of his accomplishments. As North Korean troops
overran the U. S. airfield at Suwon, Nichols led a South Korean force back to
the field to destroy abandoned U.S. aircraft. Soon after that he flew the first
of fifty air reconnaissance missions over North Korea, spotting eighteen
Soviet-made fighters on the ground, which led to a successful bombing
mission that was based on his reporting. Next he saved the life of the Korean
Air Force chief of staff whose jeep had flipped over in a swamp. In July 1950
he was wounded leading a South Korean patrol that stopped a larger North
Korean assault force attempting to infiltrate Taegu Airfield. In early August
he led a mission to recover vital components of a disabled T-34 tank while
under fire, though in that case it seems Nichols once again inflated his role.
Still, after just a few months Nichols had engaged in actions that earned him
an Air Medal, a Distinguished Flying Cross, a Soldier’s Medal for heroism not
involving combat, a Purple Heart, and a Silver Star, the latter for the T-34
mission, which allowed U. S. forces to exploit a vulnerability in the tank’s
armor.
One event that mars Nichols’ reputation even more than his tendency to
inflate his role in action was his silence and participation in a thirty-one-year
cover-up of the South Korean massacre of suspected communist civilians and
prisoners. Nichols witnessed one of the largest of these massacres near
Taejon in July 1950, which the U. S. government steadfastly denied, then later
blamed on North Korea when the bodies of several thousand South Korean
civilians were discovered. American witnesses to similar killings did
complain, and the U. S. Ambassador raised the issue with President Rhee,
which at least slowed the pace and scope of the murders. The South Korean
government did not acknowledge these shameful actions until 2005, when
former policemen admitted their role in the killings as part of an investigation
by the Korean government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. That
some American witnesses and the U. S. Government chose to look the other
way for fifty-five years is an inexcusable blemish on our nation’s sometimes
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questionable role in Asian affairs. Likewise, Nichols’ silence does him no
credit, no matter what the motive.
Nothing can excuse such behavior, but nonetheless, Nichols continued to
provide vital intelligence. With American forces hunkered into a defensive
posture on the Pusan Perimeter, Nichols drew on the capabilities of a North
Korean army radio operator and cryptographer who had fled his post in 1949
with sensitive codebooks. At that time, Nichols had the defector, Cho Yong Il,
commissioned in the South Korean Air Force and placed in command of a
radio intercept facility near Seoul. Within a few weeks, the war started and the
unit fled southward. Cho found himself at Taegu, inside the Pusan Perimeter,
where he and his men set up radio receivers and began monitoring North
Korean messages. With results comparable to the breaking of German and
Japanese codes in World War II, Cho’s unit fully capitalized on the North
Korean failure to change their codes after he escaped with copies. Perhaps the
theft even went unreported lest Cho’s former commander bear the
responsibility as well as the fatal consequences of Cho’s actions.
Whatever the reason, Nichols was delighted to find that Cho had taken the
initiative to begin the intercepts at Taegu. He immediately ordered Cho’s unit
to set up shop in his own Taegu compound, where they established an
efficient system of interpreting the intercepted messages and conveying the
information to nearby Army and Air Force headquarters. Partridge’s Fifth Air
Force thus had plenty of targeting information and it acted quickly to strike
troop formations, supply lines, and artillery emplacements. The information
was vital in defending the Perimeter, and Nichols soon moved to consolidate
all cryptological efforts under his control, making he and the information he
produced essential to the American war effort. Nichols’ proximity to the
battlefield negated the typical problem with the analysis and dissemination of
intelligence data, which was a delay in conveying actionable intelligence to
field commanders. Nichols’ unit had almost immediate access to Army and
Air Force intelligence officers who could operationalize the data quickly. The
U. S. Army commander in Korea, as well as the South Korean government,
credited Nichols with contributing to saving both the U. S. Eighth Army and
the Pusan Perimeter. With no clearly defined wartime mission, Nichols saw
opportunity and grabbed it. The Air Force was soon clamoring for even more.
By August 1950, Partridge was seeking additional targets for his bombers.
Nichols coordinated with South Korean intelligence officers and soon
recruited forty-eight agents to be dropped behind enemy lines after a rapid
one-week training program in Japan. The results of that effort and several
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subsequent infiltrations could be considered disastrous, with very few of the
agents ever returning safely. Many South Korean veterans still resent that
Nichols was seemingly insensate of the heavy toll.
In the wake of MacArthur’s Inchon landing, which placed his army in the rear
of North Korean forces besieging the Pusan Perimeter, allied troops broke out
of the perimeter and joined in chasing the North Koreans nearly to the
Chinese border. Nichols followed along in the wake of the advance,
eventually searching Kim Il Sung’s home and offices in Pyongyang. His
cryptology team set up shop at an airfield forty miles north of the capital, but
they had far less success cracking Chinese radio codes. In an intelligence
failure that exceeded even the debacle of June 1950, allied forces were caught
totally unawares when they suddenly faced hordes of Chinese troops. To their
everlasting shame, both MacArthur and Willoughby callously disregarded all
evidence that the Chinese were not only massed on the border, they were
already fighting in North Korea. Despite ample evidence of the presence of
Chinese forces, MacArthur underestimated Chinese resolve and stupidly
ordered U. S. troops to advance all the way to the Yalu River. This was a
threat Chairman Mao could not brook. On November 25, 300,000 Chinese
soldiers fell on the unsuspecting Americans and their allies. Most of them
had believed they would be home for Christmas. Instead they were swept up
in one of the nation’s most costly military disasters and sent reeling back
across the thirty-eighth parallel.
Nichols’ career benefitted from the catastrophe, though. His actions, as
noted, far exceeded the scope of duties any AFOSI agent would have been
expected to perform, so Partridge created a totally new outfit under the
auspices of the Air Intelligence Service Squadron. It soon took on the name
NICK, and it was the foundation of subsequent Air Force Special Operations
functions. Reporting directly to Partridge, Nichols was charged with
conducting sabotage and guerrilla activities behind enemy lines. As a result,
NICK was staffed largely with South Korean Air Force personnel. Nichols and
his team soon scored another intelligence coup in April 1951, when they
recovered vital parts and information from a MiG-15 that had crash landed
behind enemy lines. Nichols received a Distinguished Service Cross for that
mission, which prompted engineers to improve the performance of the
American F-86 Sabre so that it could outmaneuver the Soviet fighter.
Nichols’ power expanded even further in the aftermath of that mission, with
Partridge tasking him to gather intelligence information “by any means
necessary” (103). By the end of 1952, Nichols’ spy network and intelligence
empire had grown from a modest start to a squadron with fifty sub99
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detachments scattered across the peninsula. Over 900 Korean agents were at
his disposal, along with fifty-two U. S. Air Force personnel. The unit’s
activities were marked by some outstanding successes, such as the recovery of
an intact MiG-15 instrument panel from another crashed jet, but also by
continued disaster, such as the failed mission to blow up two railroad bridges
from which fourteen of fifteen South Korean agents did not return.
Nichols’ power was nearly absolute, and thus he grew in many ways to be
absolutely corrupt. Rumors of his homosexual behavior began to surface, and
South Korean veterans recalled how handsome young airmen would visit
Nichols in his quarters. At some point a gunfight erupted in his quarters
when Nichols was apparently attacked by a half-dozen South Koreans
resentful of his callous profligacy with their lives. Nichols killed three of them
and the others were arrested and tried. Other incidents reveal the extent that
power may have corrupted him. Once he may have ordered a South Korean
Military Policeman dropped behind enemy lines as punishment for arresting
two of his friends. In another incident, Nichols ordered a North Korean
officer suspected of murdering Chinese prisoners of war who collaborated
with Americans to be flown over the Han River and pushed out of the plane
without a parachute.
With the signing of the armistice ending the Korean War, Nichols remained at
the helm of his extensive spy network for another four years with a very brief
interlude in a U.S. assignment that was cut short after Nichols appealed to
Partridge to return to Korea. By 1955, Nichols was thriving in Korea as
commander of the Air Force’s 6006th Intelligence Squadron with the rank of
major. The expanded number of Air Force personnel under his command
apparently led to his undoing. Complaints began to flow in about his
mistreatment of the troops assigned to the squadron. Nichols behaved no
differently than he ever did, but he seemed not to grasp that he was no longer
pushing around South Koreans fearful of their own government. He was now
dealing primarily with Americans, and his “unusual and abnormal conduct,”
not to mention his excessive weight of 260 pounds, was not what they
expected of their commander, especially when the war was over (146). By
1957, few of his men even knew what Nichols had accomplished during the
war. Eventually, his old unit, AFOSI, conducted an investigation into some of
the allegations leveled against him. While the details leading to Nichols’
eventual dismissal from command were not located by Harden, one may
surmise that the involvement of AFOSI, whose mission was the investigation
of serious crimes and counterintelligence issues, meant that something other
than poor leadership lay at the root of the problem. Harden poses some
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tantalizing possibilities. Nichols apparently amassed a small fortune during
his service in Korea, so there is the suspicion of financial irregularities or
outright theft. It is also possible that his homosexual tendencies were finally
exposed as more than rumor. Lastly, Harden raises the prospect that Nichols’
close relationship with Syngman Rhee had outlived its usefulness to the U. S.
Government. Rhee was hanging on to power by a thin margin and the use of
strongman tactics bordering on a dictatorship. He and his henchmen were
increasingly seen as a threat to U. S. interests in the region.
Nichols was relieved of command in July 1957. By October he was under
psychiatric evaluation in an Air Force hospital in Japan, despite not a single
shred of evidence of mental disorder in any of his performance reports or his
medical and service records. For ten days doctors could find nothing wrong,
then Nichols grew impatient with the involuntary stay. He lashed out and
became “agitated, disoriented, and very aggressive” (159). Nichols was
sedated with Thorazine and transferred to a hospital in Florida. Confinement
to an institution with plenty of time to reflect on his traumatic experiences
and years of accumulated stress must have led Nichols to the point of
questioning his own sanity. He was eventually diagnosed as schizophrenic,
leading to a tripled dose of Thorazine and finally to electroshock treatments
as his condition deteriorated. He was stabilized, released from active duty,
and placed in disability retirement status in the spring of 1958. Nichols was
permanently separated from the Air Force four years later with a 70 disability
rating.
The disgraced spymaster never fully recovered from the shame of dismissal
and the mental health diagnosis. The remainder of his life is marked by a
series of sad events, including an arrest for child molestation in 1966,
followed by another arrest for raping a 15-year-old girl. The 320 pound
retiree skipped bail and fled to Mexico with the son he claimed to have
fathered with a Korean woman. He said he had married the woman in Korea,
but she died in childbirth. No one else ever seemed to know anything about
her. After nearly a year in Mexico, Nichols was eventually convinced to return
and face the charges with the assistance of a prominent attorney. He was
found not guilty of the sexual assault charge, and the rape charge was
dismissed when the girl changed her story.
Nichols settled down in Florida to begin work on his autobiography and his
life took on a semblance of normalcy. He was invited on a few occasions to
address special agents in training at the AFOSI Academy at Bolling AFB, and
he returned to Korea in 1987 at the invitation of his former South Korean Air
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Force comrades. There he was feted and hailed as a war hero. Shortly after
returning home, however, he was again charged with a sexual offense and he
pled nolo contendere to lewd and lascivious behavior. He was fined and
ordered to attend counseling, but another arrest followed six months later.
Nichols was confined to a psychiatric ward in a VA hospital in Alabama until
his death in 1992 at age sixty-nine, a disgraced and forgotten hero of a
forgotten war. Nichols determined to remain tied for eternity to the shadowy
world of the spy. By his instructions, the marker on his grave bears no
mention of his military service or of Korea. It does however bear the name of
his supposed Korean wife.
Spy stories can often lead one to conclude that spying is not a business for the
faint of heart. This is certainly true of Don Nichols, who embraced his
mission with a relish that indicates he was interested only in results, not in
how they were achieved. He was a man willing to do the dirty work and get
results no matter the cost. In that respect he was no worse than those for
whom he worked. His superiors welcomed his information, praised his skills,
and looked the other way. Were it not for his disreputable personal conduct,
he would undoubtedly be celebrated as a hero for the deeds he performed for
his country. Despite his braggadocio he did risk his life on numerous
occasions to accomplish his mission. He expected no less from others and he
could not have been an easy man to work for. In allowing Nichols so many
years of virtually unsupervised free rein, the Air Force contributed to letting
the renegade genie that was Don Nichols out of his bottle. Getting him back
inside was an equally ugly affair that does his handlers no credit. Blaine
Harden’s book adeptly lays out the whole process in this well written, stranger
than life tale of a man who would be king—of spies.
Edward J. Hagerty, American Military University
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